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Background. Rapid response to outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases is impeded by uncertain diagnoses and
delayed communication. Understanding the effect of inefficient response is a potentially important contribution of epidemic
theory. To develop this understanding we studied societal learning during emerging outbreaks wherein patient removal
accelerates as information is gathered and disseminated. Methods and Findings. We developed an extension of a standard
outbreak model, the simple stochastic epidemic, which accounts for societal learning. We obtained expressions for the
expected outbreak size and the distribution of epidemic duration. We found that rapid learning noticeably affects the final
outbreak size even when learning exhibits diminishing returns (relaxation). As an example, we estimated the learning rate
for the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Singapore. Evidence for relaxation during the first eight
weeks of the outbreak was inconclusive. We estimated that if societal learning had occurred at half the actual rate, the
expected final size of the outbreak would have reached nearly 800 cases, more than three times the observed number of
infections. By contrast, the expected outbreak size for societal learning twice as effective was 116 cases. Conclusion. These
results show that the rate of societal learning can greatly affect the final size of disease outbreaks, justifying investment in
early warning systems and attentiveness to disease outbreak by both government authorities and the public. We submit that
the burden of emerging infections, including the risk of a global pandemic, could be efficiently reduced by improving
procedures for rapid detection of outbreaks, alerting public health officials, and aggressively educating the public at the start
of an outbreak.
Citation: Drake JM, Chew SK, Ma S (2006) Societal Learning in Epidemics: Intervention Effectiveness during the 2003 SARS Outbreak in
Singapore. PLoS ONE 1(1): e20. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000020
INTRODUCTION
Rapidly spreading outbreaks of infectious diseases are an in-
creasing concern for global public health [1,2] and security [3].
Emerging infections, which are typically defined as infectious
diseases that have newly appeared in a population or are rapidly
increasing in incidence or geographic range [4], are a particular
concern because at the time of emergence little is known about
their epidemiology, particularly pathology, symptomatology, and
transmissibility. Thus, the crucial tasks of assessing epidemic risk
and determining what public health interventions should be taken
are complicated by uncertainty that borders on complete
ignorance. Of course, this uncertainty is rapidly reduced as the
outbreak progresses and information concerning symptoms of
infection, the biology of the infectious agent, the epidemiology of
transmission, and the effectiveness of health precautions and
intervention is collected and disseminated.
This learning process has not been considered in theories of
outbreak control [5,6] or in near real-time models of emerging
infections [7,8] (compare correspondence in refs [9,10]). Here, we
study the collective effects of various processes (including possibly
unidentified phenomena) on the change in the rate at which
infectious persons are isolated. We refer to this set of processes
collectively as ‘‘societal learning’’. A partial list of the processes
contributing to societal learning includes isolation and identifica-
tion of the infectious agent, development of tests for clinical
diagnosis, disseminating information to public health and medical
personnel, disseminating information to the public, and imple-
menting public health policies including restrictions on individual
movement or quarantine.
Disease control theory focuses on an quantity called the
reproductive ratio, designated here as R0 at the start of the
outbreak and, if changing over time, Rt at time t. Outbreaks are
considered to be under control when Rt,1, implying that outbreak
conditions are such that on average disease prevalence will decline.
Most research in theoretical epidemiology has focused on how Rt is
related to disease and population parameters in order to
understand how to induce the change from R0.1, during
emergence, to Rt,1. Recent developments include techniques
for estimating R0 from the initial stages of an outbreak [11,12] and
a model to ascertain the effect of a delay between the onset of an
outbreak and the implementation of public health policies aimed
at controlling disease spread [13]. Here, we contribute to this
developing toolbox for disease forecasting a model to understand
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disease outbreak. Though some computational disease-specific
models have recognized the importance of time-varying rates in
disease spread, particularly with respect to the outbreak of SARS
in 2003 [14,15] (compare [16]), we believe this is the first
analytical treatment of the concept.
We also retrospectively explore the effect of societal learning
during the 2003 outbreak of SARS in Singapore, using weekly
data on the time between onset of symptoms and removal of
infectious individuals. We speculate that societal learning will
generally exhibit diminishing returns because increasing the
removal rate becomes more difficult as individual isolation
approaches a theoretical maximum rate. In such a case, the rate
of societal learning is said to relax. We introduce statistical
models to distinguish between relaxing and non-relaxing learning
and test for relaxation during this outbreak. Finally, we discuss
societal and epidemiological factors that might affect societal
learning, we observe that a difficult task during the early stages
of an outbreak is to estimate the learning rate and suggest that
the rate estimated here might be used as prior information in
future outbreaks, and we conclude by recommending rapid
investment in research at the time of initial detection when
actions taken to reduce disease spread can be most efficient and
cost effective.
Public health officials routinely make judgments whether or not
to raise alarms about developing outbreaks. This decision is
complicated by severe uncertainty during the early phases of an
outbreak. Further, bureaucratic inertia and the ignorance that
necessarily accompanies emerging infections discourage rapid
response. By contrast, false alarms resulting from hasty and
premature assessment of outbreak risk can be very costly, and must
be avoided if possible. Understanding the role of societal learning
in disease outbreaks is important for properly balancing these
competing objectives.
METHODS
Basic theoretical model
Our concept of societal learning is characteristically reflected in
outbreak dynamics as an increase over time in the rate at which
infectious individuals are removed from circulating in the
population. That is, we expect that as information about clinical
symptoms, modes of transmission, the duration of incubation, etc.,
is collected and disseminated, the average time between the onset
of symptoms and individual self-removal from the population (for
instance by admission to hospital) or forced isolation (e.g.,
quarantine) will decline. From a dynamical perspective, we
represent the average removal rate of individual cases as a function
of time since the outbreak began, marked by the time at which the
index case became infectious. For emerging diseases we assume
that direct transmission between infected persons is the primary
source of infection and that development of immunity and
removing infectious individuals have negligible impact on the
susceptible population. These assumptions are reasonable for
outbreaks that ultimately do not infect more than a small fraction
of the total population, i.e., emerging infections with relatively low
prevalence. Finally, we assume that transmission is a Markov
process, an approximation that amounts to assuming that
individual infectious contacts are independent (compare [17]).
Thus, representing the individual rate of infection by the constant
parameter b0 and the rate of removal as a function of time c(t),
these assumptions imply that the growth of the epidemic is a time-
inhomogeneous stochastic birth-death chain [18–20]. Accordingly,
the change over time in the probability distribution of the number
of infected individuals x is given by
d
dt
PI t ðÞ ~ Iz1 ðÞ c t ðÞ PIz1 t ðÞ z
I{1 ðÞ b0PI{1 t ðÞ {I c t ðÞ zb0 ðÞ PI t ðÞ ,I§1:
ð1Þ
This model has been previously studied and applied to problems
ranging from population dynamics to astronomy [18,19,21]. In
particular, the expected final epidemic size for this model is [18]:
X~I0 1z
ð ?
0
b0e{r t ðÞdt
0
@
1
A, ð2Þ
where
r t ðÞ ~
ð t
0
ct ðÞ {b0dt, ð3Þ
and I0 is the initial number of infected individuals. Further, the
distribution function for the duration of the outbreak with I0=1 is:
Ft ðÞ ~1{ 1z
ð t
0
ert ðÞ ct ðÞ dt
0
@
1
A
{1
: ð4Þ
This is a very general model, as we have only specified that the
transmission rate b0 is constant and that the rate of removal c(t)
changes over time, consistent with the concept of societal learning.
Societal learning
Conceptually, we decompose the removal rate, c(t), into two
components. The first component represents removal in the
absence of societal learning (i.e., through unexceptional health
procedures or natural recovery) and is referred to as the base
removal rate. The second component is an effect of societal
learning and is assumed to be additive to the base removal rate.
Consequently, we represent the total removal rate as function of
time c(t)=a(t)+b where b is the base removal rate and a(t)i s
a function for the additional effect of societal learning. (Refer to
Table 1 for biological interpretations of parameters discussed in
this section.) Next, we consider two different learning scenarios.
First, we suppose that societal learning is constant, i.e., that over
any interval a doubling in time since the outbreak began
Table 1. Interpretation of parameters related to societal
learning.
......................................................................
symbol interpretation
c1 removal rate under simple learning model
c2 removal rate under learning model with relaxation
g1 average infectious interval under simple learning model
g2 average infectious interval under learning model with relaxation
a0 basic learning rate
a1 relaxation
b base removal rate
t time
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0000020.t001
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 December 2006 | Issue 1 | e20corresponds to a doubling in the learned component of the
removal rate. Then, the effect due to learning can be represented
as a line a(t)=a0t, where a0 is called the ‘basic learning rate’, and
the removal rate is linear: c1(t)=a0t+b. Special cases of this model
have a0=0, where there is no effect of societal learning (resulting
in the simple stochastic epidemic), and b=0 where there is no
natural recovery. The model with linear removal rate implies that
the average time between infection and removal over time follows
a hyperbola, g(t)=(c1(t))
21=(a0t+b)
21, and that there is no upper
bound to the rate at which infected individuals can be isolated;
effectively, we suppose that the average time between infection
and removal can be brought arbitrarily close to 0. For most
(perhaps all) diseases this is an unreasonable assumption in the
long run (though it may be a reasonable approximation at the start
of an outbreak). In particular, the effect of societal learning
probably decreases as the removal rate gets high and the interval
between the onset of symptoms and isolation approaches
a minimum biologically plausible quantity. This is a scenario in
which cumulative number of removed patients is a decelerating
function of time marked by diminishing returns. To incorporate
such relaxation in our model we should generalize a(t) for instance
a(t)=a0t
a1, with a1#1. Where a1=1 this model is equivalent to the
linear model discussed above. Of course, there is no principled
theoretical reason why a1 cannot be greater than 1. Such a case is
unlikely, however, and would imply acceleration not only in
removals, but in the removal rate. In either case we have the
general model for the removal rate c2(t)=a0t
a1+b and the
associated model of the duration of the interval between onset of
symptoms and removal g2(t)=c2(t)=(a0t
a1+b)
21. In this case g(t)i s
approximately a power law with respect to time. We remark that
learning relaxation could also result from diminishing returns on
methods for disseminating information. For instance, if diagnostic
information is transmitted by word-of-mouth, models for the
spread of a rumor suggest that the fraction of the population which
remains uninformed declines roughly logistically: first approxi-
mately proportional to the number of people who are in possession
of the rumor but declining constantly over time as uninformed
individuals become increasingly rare [6,22]. Examples of c1 and c2
and the associated g1 and g2 are shown in Figure 1.
Substituting the above model for societal learning in eqns (2)
and (4) obtains two quantities of special interest: the expected
outbreak size,
X~I0 1z
ð ?
0
b0e
 a0t a1z1 ðÞ
a1z1  btzb0t
dt
0
@
1
A, ð5Þ
and the distribution of extinction times,
Ft ðÞ ~1{ 1z
ð t
0
e
a0t a1z1 ðÞ
a1z1  btzb0tc2 t ðÞ dt
0
@
1
A
{1
, ð6Þ
Figure 1. Examples showing the effect of societal learning on removal rate (c) and average duration between infection and removal (g). Plots on the
left are for the simple model with no relaxation. Compare with plots on the right ranging from modest to severe relaxation. Denoting the vector of
parameters y=[a0, a1, b], plots on the left are for y=[0.0066, 1, 0.12] (black), y=[0.0086, 1, 0.12] (blue), y=[0.0106, 1, 0.12] (red). Plots on the right
are for y=[0.0066, 0.9, 0.12] (black), y=[0.0066, 0.7, 0.12] (blue), y=[0.0066, 0.5, 0.12] (red). The units in which time is measured do not affect the
form of these plots. However, for comparison the x-axis can be interpreted in units of days in which case the black points on the left side coincide
with the parameter estimates reported in Table 1. Axes on plots of g are log-log.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000020.g001
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 December 2006 | Issue 1 | e20from which the probability density of the duration of outbreaks is
obtained as the derivative with respect to time,
ft ðÞ ~
er t ðÞc t ðÞ
1z
Ð t
0
ert ðÞ ct ðÞ dt
   2 0vtv?
: ð7Þ
Finally, in this representation of the epidemic process, the
concept of the reproductive ratio (designated by R0 at the
beginning of the outbreak, Rt thereafter) is deterministic and is
given by Rt=b0/c(t). Setting this equation to one and solving for t
obtains the time until the outbreak is brought under control. For
the case c(t)=c1(t), the time to control is given by Tc=(b02b)/
a0.Still more models could be considered. However, we report
below that the final epidemic size is affected mostly by the
parameter a0, the rate of societal learning at the beginning of the
outbreak, so that the precise shape of the removal function does
not greatly matter.
Data and test for societal learning
To test for societal learning in the 2003 outbreak of SARS in
Singapore, we used the mean number of days between the onset of
clinical symptoms and removal, by week, to fit different models for
the removal process c. These data are slightly different than those
that appeared previously as Figure 1 in [15] and include some
reclassified cases based on serological tests (S. Ma, unpublished
data). Societal learning models were fit to the reciprocal of the
mean of observed lags between onset of symptoms and removal
ci=1/gi for each week i, using nonlinear least squares regression.
Model fit was assessed using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC)
assuming the observations are drawn from a normal distribution
with mean ci and homogeneous variance. We tested three
hypotheses: (i) the null hypothesis of no base removal rate
corresponding to b=0; (ii) the null hypothesis of no saturation in
learning corresponding to a1=1; finally, (iii) the null hypothesis of
no societal learning at all is given by a1=1 for a0=0.
Simulation
To represent the full epidemic process for SARS the societal
learning theory developed above must be modified to account for
a significant latent period [12]. Accordingly, we adopt the familiar
S-E-I-R modeling framework (Figure 2A in [5]), modified to
represent stochastic (Markov) dynamics with time-inhomogeneous
parameters. As before, we adopt the reasonable assumption that
the population is large compared to the eventual size of the
outbreak so that S remains constant throughout. Thus, by
substituting b0=aS and ignoring the dynamics of removed
individuals, we obtain the two-compartment model in Figure 2B,
where X and Y designate the classes that were formerly E and I.
Finally, consistent with our earlier definition of societal learning,
we allow the removal rate c to be a function of time, designated
c(t). We assume that each state variable X and Y can take only
integer values (demographic stochasticity) and that individual
transitions between classes are Markovian. This model is a pair of
coupled birth-death chains and is a generalization of the model
studied in the earlier part of this paper.
We obtained parameter values for these simulations as follows.
Using a Bayesian approach, Lipsitch et al. [15] determined that
the basic reproductive ratio (R0) for this outbreak was in the range
[2.2, 3.6]. These values accord well with the likelihood-based
estimate of Wallinga and Teunis [23], who report a point estimate
of ^ R0~3:1 and 95% confidence interval [2.3, 4.0]. Interpreting
the estimates of Lipsitch et al. [15] as the rate of secondary
infection in a wholly susceptible population, R0 is related to our
parameters through the relation b0=R06c0. Recognizing that
uncertainty in both R0 and c will affect the accuracy of model
projections we obtain an upper limit on b0 (not a confidence
interval because the parameters are not independent) from
b
+=R0
+6c
+ and a lower limit from b0
2=R0
26c
2, where (+)
and (2) indicate the upper and lower limits on the estimate
intervals for the respective parameters. To obtain a central (‘‘best’’)
estimate of b0 we take the midpoint of the range [2.2, 3.6]=2.9
and multiply by the point estimate of our regression ^ c0~0:12 to
obtain ^ b~0:35. Throughout, we used the point estimate from the
regression analysis above (0.046, see also Results) for the basic
learning rate after dividing by seven to convert from weeks to days:
a0=0.0066. As the learning rate never declined over the course of
this outbreak, no relaxation was included in the model. Finally, the
transition rate between latent and infectious individuals (g)i s
approximately equal to the reciprocal of the duration of the
incubation period. We used a transition rate of 0.15 d
21,
corresponding to an average incubation period of approximately
6.7. days. This is roughly consistent with, e.g., the ranges of
estimates compiled by the World Health Organization (Table 1 in
[24]) and the estimate (6.37 d) and 95% confidence interval [5.29,
7.75] reported by Donnelly et al. [25], but slightly larger than the
estimate of 4.8 d (95% confidence interval: [4.37, 5.29]) obtained
by Kuk and Ma [26] under the assumption that incubation times
are drawn from a Weibull distribution.
Comparison between model predictions and
observed outbreak size
Retrospectively comparing model-based estimates of the expected
outbreak size with the 238 observed cases (a partially circular
comparison to begin with) is complicated by the fact that the
number of initially infected individuals (the initial condition) is not
defined by the model but must be asserted. One possibility is to
assume that the outbreak begins with the index patient (I0=1), but
then the outbreak size of the theoretical model is biased by
a significant portion of outbreaks that fail due to stochastic fadeout
[27]. An alternative is to compare the observed outbreak size with
the theoretical distribution of outbreak sizes for outbreaks
initialized at I0=1 conditioned on a ‘major’ or ‘observable’
outbreak occurring. However, this simply pushes back the problem
of specifying the initial condition as some number of cases must be
Figure 2. (A) Basic S-E-I-R compartmental model of infectious disease, in
which outbreak dynamics are represented by the number of individuals
in four compartments corresponding to susceptible, exposed, in-
fectious, and removed (or recovered) individuals. The rate at which
individuals move from susceptible to exposed is according to mass-
action dynamics with proportionality constant a. Individuals move from
exposed to infectious at rate g and from infectious to removed at rate
c. (B) By assuming that the number of susceptible individuals is
approximately constant (an appropriate approximation for outbreaks in
which prevalence is never a large fraction of the total population) we
introduce the new variable b=aS and reduce the four-compartment S-
E-I-R model to a two-compartment model, designated here by the state
variables X and Y.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000020.g002
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a third alternative. We reasoned that the first time medical
personnel are alerted to the fact that there might be an emerging
outbreak is the time that the index patient is observed to be
infectious, corresponding to the removal of the patient from the
population. At this time, the patient has infected an expected
additional R0 individuals (by the definition of R0) and these
infectious, or soon-to-be-infectious individuals are circulating in
the susceptible population. We refer to this as the ‘second
generation initialization’. Alternatively, the hospitalization of one
individual with an anomalous infection is unlikely to attract
significant attention. Consideration of a possible outbreak more
likely corresponds to the admittance in quick succession of several
patients with anomalous infections, that is when the second
generation of infected individuals is isolated and a third generation
of individuals is infected. This is the ‘third generation initializa-
tion’. Accordingly, we simulated two distributions of final outbreak
sizes. First we initialized at I0=3, which is the midpoint of the
estimated interval for R0 identified by Lipsitch et al. [15],
I2~ ^ R0~2:9, rounded to the nearest integer, corresponding to
second generation initialization. Second, we initialized at I0=8,
which is the rounded value of the expected number of infected
individuals in the third generation, I3~ ^ R2
0&8:4. To understand
the importance of societal learning during the actual outbreak in
Singapore, we simulated 10,000 iterations of the stochastic S-E-I-
R model described above using Gillespie’s direct method [28] with
double and half the estimated basic learning rate while all other
parameters were set to their best estimates and with initial
condition I0=8. Empirical quantiles and the coefficient of
variation (a measure of dispersion, the ratio of the standard
deviation to the mean) were used to summarize the distributional
properties of simulations.
RESULTS
Effects of societal learning on final epidemic size
To look at the effects of societal learning and relaxation on
outbreak control, we studied the average outbreak size over a range
of scenarios (Figure 3). For simplicity, we assumed b0=1
throughout and compared different versions of the removal and
learning process by tuning the parameters for the basic learning
rate (a0) and the relaxation rate (a1). The temporal resolution of
this model is therefore not explicit. Thus, for concreteness assume
that all rates are in units of days and that the baseline infectious
period (g=c
21) is 3 d. Then, the basic reproductive ratio is
R0~b0=c~3 and we obtained the average epidemic size from eqn
(5) for combinations of a0 and a1 in the ranges a0[
1
6
,
5
2
  
and
a1[ 0:44,1 ½  . These ranges illustrate the range of cases between
extremes in which societal learning is slow and relaxation is rapid
(practically no effect of societal learning) and where societal
learning is fast and no relaxation occurs at all (similar to the
outbreak of SARS). Figure 3 shows that a0, the basic rate of
societal learning, can be important for controlling outbreaks. The
effect of relaxation can be examined by comparing the average
outbreak size at various values of a1,1 with the value at a1=1,
where there is no relaxation. Evidently, relaxation must be
extremely rapid (around a1=0.5) for the effect to be noticeable. Of
course, this phenomenon is accentuated by its interaction with the
basic societal learning rate so that if learning is extremely slow the
effect of relaxation becomes more important.
Figure 3. Effects of societal learning and learning relaxation on the expected outbreak size in a stochastic epidemic model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000020.g003
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Singapore
The observed removal rate increased consistently over the course
of the 2003 SARS outbreak in Singapore (Figure 4). We found no
effect of relaxation in the rate of societal learning, although there
was strong evidence for both a baseline removal rate and an effect
of learning (Table 2). We first fit the full model, but failed to reject
the null hypothesis of no relaxation. Consequently, we fit the
reduced model with a constant learning rate, which is equivalent
to the full model with exponential parameter a1=1. In this model,
both the base removal and learning parameters were highly
significantly different than zero (base: P=0.002; learning rate:
P,0.0001). We remark that the reciprocal of the estimated base
removal rate (b) can be interpreted as the duration of the infectious
period in the absence of special intervention. Accordingly, we
obtained an estimate of 8.3 d (95% confidence interval: [5.8,
14.3], obtained by inverting the confidence limits reported in
Table 2).
Inspection of the plots in Figure 4 suggests that the observation
in week 8 may be of exceptional importance to the final model. In
terms of regression diagnostics, it may have high leverage (greatly
affecting the uncertainty in parameter estimates) and high
influence (greatly affecting the estimates themselves). A plot of
standardized residuals versus leverage for the reduced model
shows that this point is indeed matched by only one other point
(week 0) for leverage (Figure 5). Overlaying contour intervals for
Cook’s distance, a measure of influence, shows that this point also
has high influence. Accordingly, so that the reader may compare
we re-fit both the full and reduced models after dropping this point
(Table 2). In this case the AIC difference is less than two, so that
neither model is better supported by the data. Further while the
Figure 4. Average daily removal rate of infectious individuals (c)
increased consistently for eight weeks following the initial outbreak of
SARS in Singapore in 2003. Average infectious period obtained as g=
1/c. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals calculated from the
t-distribution given the mean and standard deviation of observed
intervals between onset of clinical symptoms and removal. Confidence
intervals are not provided for week 0, where only one case was
observed (so zero degrees of freedom), or week 8, where the
combination of high standard deviation in the observed interval (s.d.:
1.9) and few degrees of freedom (d.f.: 5) results in a nonsensical
confidence interval that includes zero and negative values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000020.g004
Table 2. Parameter estimates for a model of societal learning in the 2003 SARS outbreak in Singapore.
..................................................................................................................................................
a0 (wk
21) parameter a1 (no units) b (wk
21)A I C
Full Model 0.046 (20.016, 0.109) 1.0007 (0.395, 1.606) 0.121 (0.040, 0.202) 227.7
Reduced Model 0.046 (0.036, 0.057) na 0.121 (0.070, 0.172) 229.7
Full Model (w/o week 8) 0.079 (0.052, 0.159) 0.676 (0.352, 0.999) 0.105 (0.023, 0.134) 230.2
Reduced Model (w/o week 8) 0.040 (0.300, 0.049) na 0.137 (0.096, 0.177) 228.7
95% Wald confidence intervals shown in parentheses. Model selection is based on AIC, with the model with lowest AIC being most parsimonious. AIC values differing by
two or more are sufficiently different to prefer the model with the lower AIC. AIC values for models fit to different datasets (i.e., with and without the observation at
week 8) are not comparable. Due to correlation of parameters, the full model in unable to estimate a0 and b with high precision (i.e., large confidence intervals).
However, in the model fit to all the data finding that a1 is negligibly different than 1 justifies removing this parameter from the model (resulting in the reduced model),
permitting much more precise estimation of the remaining parameters. The AIC difference in this case is entirely due to the superfluous parameter a1.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0000020.t002
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Figure 5. Plot of standardized residuals vs. leverage for nine
observations used in the statistical model. One point (corresponding
to week 8, in the upper right hand corner of the plot) exhibits high
leverage and falls outside the Cook’s distance contour at C=1. As this
point may have unduly influenced the estimated model, the full and
reduced models were re-fit to the data excluding this point.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000020.g005
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interpreted as considerable relaxation), the confidence interval
barely fails to include 1, so the evidence is not conclusive.
Effect of latent period
To study the effect of the duration of the latent period on average
outbreak size, we simulated 500 iterations of the model at each of
13 different durations for the average latent period. The average
outbreak size decreased with the duration of the latent period as
shown in Figure 6.
Comparison between model and observed outbreak
size
The average size of simulated outbreaks initiated with the second
generation initialization condition (I0=3) was 102 cases. The 2.5%
and 97.5% quantiles were 4 and 321 cases, respectively. The
coefficient of variation in the final outbreak size was 0.85. The
average size of simulated outbreaks initiated with the third
generation initialization condition (I0=8) was 278 cases. The 2.5%
and 97.5% quantiles were 56 and 611 cases, respectively, with
coefficient of variation 0.52. Thus, the observed total outbreak size
(238 cases; [29]) is consistent with either the second or the third
generation initialization conditions. Outbreak simulations in which
learning occurred at half the observed rate had average final
outbreak size of 799 cases while outbreak simulations in which
learning occurred at twice the observed rate had average final
outbreak size of 116 cases.
DISCUSSION
We found little evidence for relaxation in the learning rate for
SARS in Singapore. First, restricting our discussion to the analysis
with all data, we find that the maximum likelihood estimate of the
relaxation parameter is extraordinarily close to one (differing by
0.07%), perfect non-relaxation. Admittedly, the confidence in-
terval on this parameter is large. One interprets this to mean that
the vigilance of the public health community as a whole continued
throughout the outbreak and that improvement in intervention
effectiveness continued unabated. However, we also found that
one relatively uncertain data point was important to this analysis
(week 8). Whether this point should be excluded from in-
terpretation is unclear. On one hand, it is a real observation and
(because of its high influence) is known to contain a great deal of
information. Therefore, one is inclined to allow this observation
considerable weight. On the other hand, its importance, especially
at the end of the data series is suspicious. If we exclude this point
from analysis post hoc, we find that we are unable to make any
strong conclusions at all. What most likely occurred is that the
distribution of average infectious period at the point where the
outbreak was rapidly brought under control was highly dispersed
(high variance) and highly skewed. Accordingly, the mean removal
rate probably does relax, but the data that were available to this
study are too aggregated to make this inference conclusively.
It is unknown if the rate of learning estimated in this study is
unique to this outbreak or if it might be more representative. We
remark that both parameters in the learning rate model are readily
interpreted, and that theoretical effects of improvement in
surveillance, mechanisms for informing public health personnel
and the public, and rapid research response could be studied by
extending this simple model to represent more realistically the
effects of alternative policies as covariates.
The final size of an outbreak is greatly affected by transmission
events early during the outbreak process. Outbreaks can be
curtailed when public health interventions are rapid and efficient.
But the severity of an outbreak is often unclear during these initial
stages of transmission when intervention can be most effective
[11,27]. Further, there are limits to how quickly diagnostic
information about an emerging infection can be obtained and
disseminated to health care providers. This is not the first model to
consider the effect of changes in the removal rate (e.g., [14,15]).
However, in contrast to earlier studies, we first explicitly
considered societal learning parametrically in a theoretical model.
Our model also more realistically represents the ramping up of
intervention in contrast to models that simply have ‘‘before
control’’ and ‘‘after control’’ regimes (e.g., [13]). We showed that
the final outbreak size decreases rapidly with a modest investment
in learning. We also found strong evidence of learning in data
from the 2003 outbreak of SARS in Singapore. Public health
interventions for SARS include encouragement to report to
hospital rapidly after the onset of clinical symptoms, contact
tracing for confirmed and suspected cases, and quarantine,
monitoring, and restricting the travel of contacts [25,30]. We
believe these interventions were highly effective at reducing the
final size of the SARS outbreak.
A limitation of this analysis is that we only consider temporal
changes in removal, though information dissemination and public
concern almost certainly led to a decline in transmission (b0) too
[15]. Unfortunately, this effect is much more difficult to
independently estimate and must instead be inferred from the
information provided by the epidemic curve together with
observations of the onset-of-symptoms to removal interval. In
general, however, the model studied here (eqn 1) and its solution
(eqn 2) will also apply to this situation and can be used wherever
such data are available. The effects of biological and social factors
that might bring about changes in transmissibility is an important
area for further theoretical research.
Our estimate of the duration of the infectious period (8.3 d,
95% CI: [5.8, 14.3]) is consistent with measures of viral shedding,
obtained by Peiris et al. [31] using quantitative reverse
transcriptase on sequential nasopharyngeal aspirates/throat and
nose swabs (NPA/TNS), in which maximum virus excretion
occurs around the tenth day of illness (compare also [24]). Indeed,
only about 35% of NPA/TNS continued to test positive by the
third week since the onset of symptoms [24].
Figure 6. Relationship between the average latent period (x-axis) and
average total outbreak size in simulations (y-axis). Latent period is log2
transformed (to illustrate a wide range of possible values) and ranges
from 1 d to 4096 d (,11 y). The approximate location of SARS is
indicated by the arrow.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000020.g006
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start of an outbreak (high a0). The processes considered to
contribute to societal learning include such publicly visible actions
as declaring a state of emergency, global health alert, or
(minimally) disseminating information to the public. The societal
and economic costs of mistakenly declaring a state of emergency
can be tremendous, but are probably small in comparison to the
costs of failing to intervene in a major preventable outbreak. Thus,
we echo Anderson et al. [32] in concluding that the major lessons
of the 2003 outbreak of SARS are to improve surveillance and
detection, including real-time data collection; develop capability
for rapid response by the research community; and devise
mechanisms for immediate implementation of effective interven-
tions. Important topics for research include estimating the effect of
learning on transmission (the parameter b0 in the model), and
identifying the different activities that contribute to learning (a0)
and relaxation (a1) and their costs. Then, a cost sensitive model
should be developed to balance the competing goals of raising
unnecessary alarm and preventing a major outbreak. Such a model
would be most useful if it had reference points that would trigger
alerts at different levels (i.e., to function as an early warning system)
and could guide intervention efforts. Such a model would not need
to be purely economical, but could incorporate loss of human life
and well-being as constraints on the decision set.
Of course, learning rates (and possibly relaxation) will vary
geographically reflecting different societal conditions, research
institutions, levels of emergency preparedness, etc. Further, these
phenomena may also differ among emerging diseases, for instance
depending on their similarity to diseases that are well understood
or their resistance to laboratory isolation and characterization.
Despite these limitations, we suggest that our estimate of the basic
learning rate (0.0066 d
21; 95% confidence interval [0.0051,
0.0081]) could be used as prior information during future
outbreaks. The difficulty of forecasting the total epidemic curve
at an early stage is well appreciated [7]. By eliminating the need to
simultaneously estimate highly correlated parameters, a good
understanding of the dynamical consequences of public health
response would enable real-time modeling to focus on estimating
disease parameters like transmission rates [11]. Then, estimated
disease components and known or conjectured models for
response, including models of societal learning, could be integrated
in a single modeling framework for projections.
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